Critical Minerals
When strategic materials that underpin modern industry and national defense are allowed to drift into concentrated foreign control, the result is supply vulnerability, distorted markets, and growing geopolitical leverage over the United States.
This Study Guide equips current and future policymakers with the context and analytical frameworks needed to challenge simplistic calls to “fix critical minerals” and to defend a more targeted, risk-aware, and strategically grounded approach to reducing American dependence on China.
Frontiers: Re-industrialization offers the opportunity to connect with like-minded peers and forge connections with policy-specific mentors working to lead America’s re-industrialization and energy dominance efforts in the Golden Age.
What You’ll Learn
The following Study Guide begins with first principles—geology, industrial structure, and market dynamics—before moving into historical case studies, contemporary policy debates, and detailed policy debriefs. By the end of this Study Guide, you will be able to answer the following:
- The basics of U.S. critical mineral policy
- How the critical mineral list is created
- The main policy options for reducing reliance on foreign mineral supply chains
- Why geology and market structure matter for policy design
- How and why policymakers should prioritize some minerals over others
This Study Guide was created in partnership with Farrell Gregory of the Foundation for American Innovation.
Part I: A Primer
Critical minerals are materials that are essential to modern economic activity and national security, but whose supply chains are vulnerable to disruption because of concentrated production, geopolitical risk, or limited alternatives.
In the United States, the official list is maintained by the U.S. Geological Survey in coordination with the U.S. Department of the Interior, and is based on two core criteria:
- a mineral’s importance to the U.S. economy and defense, and
- the risk that its supply could be disrupted
Crucially, “critical” does not mean rare in a geological sense—many of these materials exist in multiple countries—but rather that the United States lacks reliable, diversified access to the mining, processing, or manufacturing stages needed to turn them into usable inputs for technologies such as defense systems, energy infrastructure, electronics, and advanced manufacturing.
From the steady offshoring of mineral extraction and processing in the late twentieth century to today’s dependence on China-dominated supply chains for dozens of essential materials, the American experience shows that secure access to critical minerals is not merely an economic issue—it is a core national-interest challenge. However, not all critical minerals pose the same risks, and not all can—or should—be addressed with the same policy tools.
Closing the Critical Mineral Gap
Report by In-Q-Tel
Summary: This is an excellent overview of dynamics within the category of critical minerals and an accessible starting place. Prepared by In-Q-Tel — a nonprofit investment group to help U.S. intelligence agencies quickly use new technology from private companies — reading this will give you a sense of the perspective and priorities of the U.S. government, especially those tasked with reducing reliance on China through targeted investment.
- Additionally, because it is two years old, you might be able to notice where circumstances have dramatically changed, such as in rare earths.
Why Read: The publication is full of useful charts, which do a better job of illustrating the dynamics of critical mineral markets than text. Additionally, the author compares different minerals, which points to the fundamental insight of this study guide: not all critical minerals are equally critical. Knowing more about the geology, industrial dynamics, and final applications can help us make more informed policy choices, especially as we begin to take bigger bets on specific companies.
Study Question: This was published in 2023 – is there anything you can already appreciate that has changed since then aside from rare earth export controls? Do any of the predictions or assumptions made here no longer apply?
Making Sense of U.S. Geological Surveys
Report by U.S. Department of the Interior
Summary: Every year, the U.S. Geological Survey releases Mineral Commodity Surveys, which are deeply-researched and the most information-dense publications on critical mineral statistics anywhere. Additionally, USGS is required by law to update its critical mineral list and define which minerals and materials meet the threshold, every three years.
- This publication utilizes Mineral Commodity Survey data to outline the new 2025 Critical Mineral list, which has now expanded to sixty different materials. The authors include very useful statistics on material origins, reliance, and potential for disruption, alongside descriptions of methodology.
Why Read: While most critical mineral dynamics have remained the same over the past three years, it is important to rely on the most up-to-date data found here. Additionally, this USGS publication (alongside others) is an excellent reference for studying individual materials. Most importantly, this publication maps out the relative criticality of different materials, based on likelihood of disruption and risk-adjusted economic impact. This points towards a very important theme that will come up later in the study guide: prioritization.
Study Question: What sorts of distinctions would you draw between different minerals? Origin, China influence, impact from disruption. Would you challenge any of the assumptions that USGS makes in determining risk. For instance, they state that Canada and South Africa are less reliable sources than Russia, for the purposes of risk modeling. Why?
Part II: China
How did decades of policy and business choices — combined with the realities of geology and industrial structure — push the United States into deep dependence on China for critical mineral supply chains?
These readings show that today’s vulnerability is not inevitable, but the result of specific strategic decisions. Reversing it requires understanding where industrial policy and geology truly constrain our options.
by Farrell Gregory
Summary A very detailed examination by author Farrell Gregory of the geology of rare earths and a few clarifications on the factors at play. Using these, he highlights the dynamics pushing the US and China towards another rare earth export control crisis.
Why Read Gregory a very clear and thorough look at the geology, which is so frequently overlooked, and is itself not an easy subject to understand for non-geoscience people. Additionally, he explains why to focus on rare earths above any other material.
Study Question What role does geology play regarding other critical minerals? How does a lack of precision in discussing geology and geopolitics hinder developing good policy?
Vance on American Manufacturing Dominance
by a16z
Summary: Vice President JD Vance gave this very well-received speech back in February at the a16z American Dynamism Summit about the need for reindustrialization.
- Vance says that over previous decades, too many policymakers and business leaders saw the economy as operating indepenently of our strategic interests and the needs of the American people. It’s no wonder, then, that growth based on an endless appetite for cheap labor and seclusion at the end of the value chain would result in overreliance on China.
- To reindustrialize, he said, America must capitalize on its comparative advantages while recognizing the technical facts of modern geopolitics. Developing and diffusing technology is the way to do so, ultimately operating under the correct complementary view of capital, labor, and national interest.
Why Watch: His speech, which touches on critical minerals, proves two essential points:
- Relegating American companies to designing, rather than manufacturing, will result in reliance on China. Over time, when American countries give up the initial stages of value adding process, such as material extraction and manufacturing, it’s only a matter of time before we give up design as well.
- America’s edge is in technology. We don’t have, and shouldn’t want, labor as inexpensive as China’s. Nor should automation be a full substitute for American labor. The optimistic case for novel technology in mining and processing is that it allows American workers to do more with less, boosting productivity and our competitive edge.
Study Question: Similarities are clear: outsourcing more simple work allows China to climb the value ladder, eventually moving to design. Not working with raw materials/basics is a long-run threat. But mineral access relies, in large part, on geology: how does this make things different from the larger re-industrialization effort?
Revving Up Reindustrialization
by Farrell Gregory
Farrell Gregory at FAI breaks down Vice President Vance’s speech at the a16z American Dynamism Summit and revisits why critical minerals are important:
“Vice President Vance articulated that vision as the keynote speaker at a16z’s American Dynamism conference. He spoke of an economy that rewards innovation, promotes domestic manufacturing, and provides American workers with both prosperity and purpose. So far, this is the most direct articulation of the Trump administration’s plan for reindustrialization.” Read it here.
by Daniel Kishi
Summary This article explains how the United States lost its once-dominant rare earth and magnet industry through a series of policy, regulatory, and industrial decisions that allowed China to build a near-monopoly across mining, processing, and magnet manufacturing.
Why Read Kishi demonstrates that rare earth dependence is the result of specific, reversible policy choices rather than inevitable globalization or superior Chinese geology.
- It is especially valuable for understanding how market manipulation, foreign acquisitions, and regulatory asymmetries can permanently reshape industrial ecosystems—and why rebuilding a mine-to-magnet supply chain requires coordinated industrial policy, not isolated mining projects.
Key Quote: “The leverage China has demonstrated this year is the cumulative result of decisions by U.S. policymakers dating back to the late twentieth century that enabled a homegrown mine-to-magnet ecosystem to disintegrate.”
Study Question Which specific U.S. policy failures in this article were most decisive in allowing China to dominate rare earth magnets, and how should those lessons shape today’s approach to rebuilding domestic refining and manufacturing capacity?
Part III: Dominance
The United States can rebuild domestic critical-mineral capacity using concrete, implementable policy tools rather than broad calls for industrial revival. These readings examine how financing authorities, price stabilization, and demand-side supports can be used to attract private investment and counter the market power and policy leverage exercised by China, while recognizing that different minerals require different domestic policy responses.
by Dean Ball
Summary Dean Ball advocates utilizing Defense Production Act Title III authorities for financing critical mineral projects. He explains which government agencies can, and will, act on this question.
Why Read It is a very thorough account and highly detailed. Too often, the conclusion of a conversation about critical minerals is that “the government must do something.”
- But which parts of the government? Dean’s article is very useful for establishing which agencies have which authorities and can play particular roles in supporting investment in critical mineral projects domestically.
Study Question: Compare Dean’s policies to what the administration has already done. What’s left to do? Congress has still failed to pass meaningful legislation, why?
by Farrell Gregory
Summary Gregory examines price floor policies during the end of the Biden administration. He explains how the threat of Chinese influence over critical mineral supply chains isn’t just that they might cut off access. Instead, with enough concentration, they could strategically flood the market, suppressing commodity prices, and force American industry to fail. This kind of instability also disincentivizes investment from American firms.
Why Read This article explains a few key dynamics that previous sources have only lightly touched. China has a wide range of policy levers that it can pull to ensure that America remains reliant on their supplies.
Key Point Establishing a price floor, while costly, could be necessary for certain minerals and related industrial projects. But for other materials, as he notes, a price floor may not be feasible or desirable.
Study Question Consider the question policy matching between America and China. If China offers X support to its industry, America must do the same. What are the pros and cons of this idea?
Competing for Africa’s Minerals
by Sydney Tucker
Summary This is a detailed account of the respective strategies that America and China each pursue in investing in African natural resources.
Key Point Compared to the laissez-faire attitude of American policymakers, Chinese firms often work in concert with the government, resulting in bilateral deals to support private-public investment that advances Chinese strategic interests.
- It also points to the complexities obscured by pointing to reliance on China. The PRC itself is reliant on many distant countries to provide raw materials, which the Chinese in turn process and turn into intermediate products. These countries are themselves battlegrounds that, as the article demonstrates, the Chinese have been dominating.
Why Read President Trump has fashioned himself after Roosevelt in many ways, including antitrust law, which you can learn more about in American Moment’s study guide on the topic. Understanding the ongoing cases, which will likely take years to resolve, is key to understanding antitrust law today.
Study Question While recognizing that American national interest may necessitate working with foreign countries to procure raw materials, how do we ensure that our policy in these countries remains rooted in America First principles? In other words, nothing comes before national interest. But when working with many of these countries, we risk being drawn into petty conflicts, development, and mission creep. What’s the America First framework for this kind of engagement?
Part IV: Prioritization
If there’s a single word that categorizes the current state of critical mineral policy, it is this: prioritization.
For more than a decade, policymakers, private firms, and think tankers have been warning about America’s overreliance on China for a wide range of materials: according to USGS, it’s now up to sixty. However, we have been largely unsuccessful in our efforts to decrease that reliance. Why?
Is it that we’re not interested enough? No. ‘Critical mineral’ has become a buzzword that becomes tied to all sorts of unrelated proposals and policies, resulting in a flood of white papers and roundtables. Plenty of people are interested in critical minerals.
Is it that we’re not spending enough money? No, Congress has allocated billions for various policies, the executive branch has directed billions more, and countless companies have sprung up to address America’s critical mineral crisis.
More than anything, the issue is a lack of concrete focus. It is too easy to treat ‘critical mineral’ as a uniform category, which neglects a fundamental truth: not all minerals are equally critical. The In-Q-Tel report and USGS publication both point to this fact. Chinese influence varies, and the strategic imperatives differ, when examining different minerals. Rare earths are so notable because they are both necessary in essential military and commercial applications and monopolized by the Chinese. More distant threats, such as relying on China for a plurality of a less-strategic material, should be treated as such.
For all the billions we’ve spent, America is not drawing on a bottomless reserve. It is better to understand potential spending, both public and private, as a fixed pool. As policymakers, you should want to maximize beneficial outcomes relative to spending. Of course, this does require taking risks. But without an appetite for risk and a recognition that continued overreliance on China is intolerable, we will continue spinning our wheels on critical minerals.
The Trump administration clearly understands the necessity of prioritization: some minerals are more critical than others, different minerals require different policies, and successful industrial policy requires taking risks.
So, the administration has been pursuing a strategy of prioritization along these lines. It will allow the categorical 45X Tax Credit to expire, which provided equal tax credits to all critical mineral projects, regardless of relative criticality.
At the same time, the administration has poured billions into deals with specific companies that are working to address America’s most pressing material dependencies. For instance, the DOW deal with MP Materials resulted in USG taking a major equity stake, providing a price floor for output, and financing for necessary industrial sites to produce magnets that use light rare earth elements. Similar agreements with companies like ReElement Technologies and Vulcan are also aimed at addressing rare earth reliance.
There is no guarantee that these deals will each succeed. But the administration is clearly focused on the most critical materials, recognizing that the previous years of categorical benefits and risk-hedging were insufficient to meet our needs.
That’s not to say that prioritization requires focusing on some minerals to the exclusion of others. It is possible to pursue different policies for different minerals in a complementary way. For instance, the total size of the copper market likely means that price floors for American projects would cost billions that could be more effectively spent elsewhere. However, accelerating permitting for American copper projects is still a viable and highly desirable policy, one that wouldn’t conflict with more capital-intensive support for smaller-market commodities like rare earths.
Prioritization is a short-term goal. The long-term goal of reindustrialization, of which critical mineral policy is a subset, is to reinvigorate a self-reinforcing domestic environment. As the Vice President highlighted in his speech, industrial knowledge spreads out. Economies of scale deliver new, unanticipated, efficiencies. If the immediate expectation is to support developing domestic mineral production in recognition of our interests regarding China, the long term hope is that a flourishing and reindustrialized America will discover new efficiencies, both technological and geographic, that enable us to competitively deliver the materials that enable modern civilization.
The point of America’s critical mineral policy should be to decrease China’s leverage as quickly as possible. That can’t be done by trying to solve all critical mineral reliance issues simultaneously. Successful industrial policy requires sorting out, to the best of policymakers’ abilities, a complicated web of domestic, international, public, and private interests. Commodity markets are especially complex, with price information and updates diffused throughout the world. Mistakes are inevitable. But the present conditions are intolerable. American leaders should be laser-focused on ensuring that our efforts yield tangible results, as soon as possible.
A special thanks to the team at the Foundation for American Innovation—especially non-resident fellow Farrell Gregory—for their collaboration.
Farrell Gregory is a non-resident fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation. He researches industrial strategy, Chinese tech, and critical mineral policy. Follow him here.
